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Abstract 
This paper shows that labor income plays an important positive role for the decision to work 
after retirement. Especially individuals who have the chance to substantially supplement their 
pension entitlements have a higher earnings elasticity. Men are more attracted by earnings 
incentives than women. Also individuals who work until retirement can easier be attracted by 
financial incentives to work after retirement than those with bridge options. Our analysis is 
based on a representative and large administrative individual career data set that includes 
employer information. We use an endogeneity correction model to estimate labor and non-
labor financial determinants of labor market participation after retirement. 
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1 Introduction 
Labor force participation of retirees increased strongly in most European countries in recent 
years (Eurofound, 2012). On average, the employment rate for individuals aged between 65 
and 74 years has risen from 5.2% in 2002 to 8.7% (an increase of 67%) in 2014 in the EU-15 
Countries (Rhein, 2016).2  
Individual, social and work-related push and pull factors have been put forward as drivers of 
post-retirement employment (Anger et al., 2018; Büsch et al., 2010; Burkert and Hochfellner, 
2017; Cahill et al., 2015; Fasbender et al., 2016; Maxin and Deller, 2010; Micheel et al., 
2010; Pleau and Shauman, 2013; Wang et al., 2008; Westermeier, 2019). Besides education 
and health, the individual financial situation is frequently highlighted as a key driver of work 
after retirement (Kim and Feldman, 2000; Larsen and Pedersen, 2017; Wang et al., 2008). 
When looking closer at the measurement of the financial situation of retirees, it however 
becomes evident that so far no contribution on work after retirement made a distinction 
between labor and non-labor earnings. Some papers include non-labor income after retirement 
such as pension entitlements (Hochfellner and Burkert, 2013). Other papers bundle up non-
labor and labor income after retirement by for example using household income after 
retirement (Anger et al., 2018; Micheel et al., 2010; Pfarr and Maier, 2015). A last group of 
papers looks at wealth or the subjective economic status before retirement (Fasbender et al., 
2016; Wang et al., 2008). 
Empirical approaches that do not separate labor and non-labor earnings after retirement may 
however report biased results on financial determinants of work participation after retirement. 
According to standard labor supply theory, labor earnings are assumed to increase work 
participation and non-labor income is assumed to decrease it (Cahuc et al., 2004). When work 
has a higher reward, workers substitute leisure against work. An increase in non-labor income 
has a negative effect on work participation or working hours. The income effect induces 
workers to reduce work because they can maintain a target standard of living with lower labor 
burden. This paper for the first time distinguishes between income and substitution effects of 
work and non-work income after retirement on work participation and shows the empirical 
relevance of both drivers. 
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 Also in Germany, the labor force participation rate of people aged 65 to 74 increased to 9.6% in 2014 from 
4.2% in 2002, implying a rise of almost 140% (Rhein, 2016). 
 
The extensive labor supply margin response on marginal work income changes depends on 
the density of the distribution of reservation wages around the economy´s equilibrium. This 
density is small for the entire working-age population because relatively few people 
voluntarily do not work (Chetty et al., 2011). It is therefore hard to estimate reliable earnings 
elasticities on labor supply for the entire population. Relatively many employees at the end of 
their career are closer to the margin of re-entering the labor force for available earnings 
opportunities, however. As the previous labor contract ends when entering retirement, all 
employees close to retirement have to decide whether to work in a new labor contract or not 
besides receiving retirement benefits. Upon retirement, labor re-entry incidence and extensive 
margin responses to earnings options therefore are relatively high in comparison to the 
earnings elasticity for the entire population (Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009).  
Analogously to people close to retirement, all women with a small child have to decide 
whether to work again or continue to provide full time childcare. As a consequence, also the 
extensive margin response to earnings incentives is relatively high (and easier to measure) for 
women with small children. The empirical literature on mothers with young children shows 
that besides non-labor financial means such as household income, childcare costs or public 
transfers such as parental allowance, also (potential) labor earnings are an important driver of 
labor market re-entry (Allègre et al., 2015; Borra, 2010; Connelly, 1992; Del Boca and Vuri, 
2007; Ribar, 1992; Viitanen, 2005). The empirical identification strategy on financial 
incentives for the labor force participation of mothers after their parental leave period 
therefore can be transferred to the labor supply decision of old workers after their retirement. 
As a consequence, we assume that also for retirees, (potential) labor earnings are an important 
driver for work after retirement besides non-labor earnings. 
The main aim of this paper is to estimate the percentage change in labor force participation 
after retirement in response to a percentage change in the financial reward from labor and 
non-labor income. For individuals not working beyond retirement, potential earnings are 
estimated using Heckman´s (1976; 1979) approach to correct for sample selection. We show 
that (potential) labor earnings are an important pull factor for the decision to engage in 
employment beyond retirement. We also find that there is a sizeable negative pension 
entitlement (non-labor income) effect on the probability of working after retirement. As a 
consequence, the higher the ratio between expected post-retirement labor earnings and 
pension entitlements, the larger the likelihood of post-retirement employment. The empirical 
analysis also provides evidence of heterogeneous earnings elasticities between retiree groups. 
 
More specifically, we show that women are less responsive to higher labor earnings than men. 
Especially men with low earnings before retirement have high earnings elasticities. We in 
addition find that individuals who use the bridge options partial retirement or unemployment 
before early retirement are less responsive to higher labor earnings after retirement than their 
counterparts who work until retirement. 
This paper makes the following contributions to the literature on empirical determinants of 
work beyond retirement: First, the importance of labor earnings for work beyond retirement is 
established for the first time. Second, large-scale and representative administrative social 
security panel data from the Institute for Employment Research (Sample of Integrated Labor 
Market Biographies (SIAB7514)) are used. Studies on the relationship between financial 
incentives and work beyond retirement previously typically relied on small-scale and 
potentially specific sub-populations (Kim and Feldmann, 2000; Saba and Guerin, 2005; Torka 
et al., 2012) or on survey-based data that may be affected by self-selection and measurement 
error in key variables (Anger et al., 2018; Büsch et al., 2010; Dittrich et al., 2011; Pfarr and 
Maier, 2015, Saba and Guerin, 2005). Our data include reliable information on daily earnings 
and individuals’ employment histories beyond the statutory retirement age of 65. Third, a rich 
set of employer characteristics allows us to control for additional determinants on the decision 
on working beyond retirement. Fourth, based on hypotheses we show heterogeneities in labor 
earnings elasticities between selected employee groups. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, a theoretical model is presented and the 
theoretical predictions how individuals respond to financial incentives are derived. In Section 
3, the data set is introduced and descriptive statistics of differences between employees who 
continue and who do not continue to work beyond retirement are provided. In Section 4, the 
empirical method is described and the empirical results are presented in Section 5. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes the analysis. 
2 Theoretical considerations  
2.1 Basic model 
According to the standard labor supply model, retirees maximize their utility by comparing 
consumption made possible by labor and non-labor income with leisure (Cahuc et al., 2004). 
In doing so, they face the decision of whether to work or not. Figure 1 shows different 
possible budget lines as well as the retirees´ corresponding indifference curves. The slope of 
 
the indifference curves (UA, UB, UC, UD) defines the marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure. Their shape corresponds to consumption and leisure being defined 
as “normal” goods with decreasing marginal returns.  
In this model, individual income consists of non-labor income (for example pension 
entitlements) V and labor earnings W. The earnings derived from work after retirement 
correspond to the opportunity costs of leisure. The point where one of the retiree’s 
indifference curves tangents the budget line is the combination of earnings and leisure with 
which the retiree maximizes utility under the budget constraint. 
Figure 1 shows that if potential hourly labor earnings after retirement are too low, the 
individual does not work after retirement. The maximum indifference curve,    crosses the 
budget line at point A and the retiree consumes only non-labor earnings V0. If hourly labor 
earnings and accordingly the slope of the budget line increase, utility is maximized at point B 
with UB>UA. The retiree therefore decides to work after retirement (substitution effect) and 
we can derive the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: The higher the (potential) labor earnings after retirement, the greater the 
likelihood to work after retirement. 
An increase in non-labor income from V0 to V1 results in a parallel shift of the budget line. 
With higher non-labor income, labor force participation decreases because the retiree can now 
consume the same quantity of goods when working less (income effect). In Figure 1, this is 
depicted by steeper indifference curves at a given leisure level with increasing V. Thus, an 
increase in the pension entitlements decreases the opportunity cost of leisure. In Figure 1 this 
effect is illustrated as a shift from point B to point C. Note that with an increase in V that is 
strong enough, at a given labor earnings level, pensioners may decide to stop working. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis is derived:  
Hypothesis 2: The higher the pension entitlements (non-labor income), the lower the 
likelihood to work after retirement. 
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Figure 1: Labor supply model of retirees. 
 
Source: own illustration. 
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Given the higher pension entitlement, V1, higher potential labor earnings (W2 instead of W1) 
are needed to incentivize the retiree to work as much as in point B (point D, for example). A 
higher substitution effect has to compensate for a higher income effect for labor market 
participation after retirement. Hypothesis 3 combines the first two hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: The higher the ratio between the (potential) labor earnings after retirement and 
non-labor income, the greater the likelihood that the retiree works after retirement. 
2.2 Heterogeneous responses to financial incentives 
We now derive factors that explain differences in labor earnings elasticities for the labor force 
participation between retiree groups. Arguments concerning different responses of individuals 
to financial incentives from labor supply theory and existing empirical results on post-
retirement employment are built upon to derive hypotheses that can be tested in the empirical 
analysis. 
In the labor supply literature, a robust finding is that earnings elasticities of women exceed 
that of men (Bargain et al., 2014; Evers et al., 2005; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001). The 
difference between gender groups is explained by the division of labor within the family. 
According to Blau and Kahn (2007) and Mincer (1962), women substitute their time between 
market work, home production, and leisure, whereas men primarily substitute their time 
between market work and leisure. As women have closer substitutes for market work than 
men, they are expected to have larger earnings substitution effects. The literature stresses that 
household production increases the elasticity of labor supply because home-made goods are 
substitutes for commercial goods (Cahuc et al., 2004; Mincer, 1962).  
At first sight, these general labor supply mechanisms also apply for women and men after 
their retirement. The share of older women engaged in household production (e.g., care of 
relatives, childcare of grandchildren) is higher than the comparable share of men (Hank and 
Buber, 2009). In addition, there is a second spike in household production after age 60 that is 
larger for women than for men, compare Vargha et al. (2017). There is a decisive difference 
for the calculation of employment earnings elasticities between the average labor supply 
decision and that for work after retirement, however. Until retirement, the share of men who 
do not work is much smaller than the share of women (Blau and Kahn, 2007). The labor 
market attachment of men who potentially can join the workforce therefore may be lower than 
that of women – earnings elasticity of a group in general is negatively related to its prior labor 
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market participation (Bastani et al., 2020). On day one after retirement, labor market 
participation of men and women is set to zero, however. As a consequence, the density at the 
earnings margin to re-enter employment may be higher for male retirees than for female 
retirees given the higher home production duties of women that make labor market 
participation less attractive or impossible for them. Therefore, it is assumed that the labor 
earnings elasticity for old women is lower than that for old men: 
Hypothesis 4: Women have lower post-retirement labor earnings elasticities than men. 
In Germany, there are various ways to transit from employment to retirement (Rasner and 
Etgeton, 2014). A substantial portion of older workers use a so-called bridge option (Brussig, 
2015), i.e. unemployment between work and retirement and partial retirement.3 Both bridge 
options can be used by employees after 15 contribution years to pension retirement and at 
least 8 years of contributions periods in the last 10 years before retirement. They therefore are 
not viable for employees with large labor market gaps and a low labor market attachment in 
general. In both bridge options, employees usually have to accept financial disadvantages in 
comparison to their other (early) retirement options, but they can exit employment already 
before their retirement date. Indeed, labor market exit age on average is between one to two 
years earlier for those using partial retirement or retirement after unemployment than for those 
who use the early retirement options that also would have been available for those who used 
bridge options (Geyer et al., 2019).4 We therefore assume that employees who use a bridge 
option put a relatively high value on leisure at old age and they therefore are less inclined to 
work after retirement. A lower inclination to work after retirement also has been found for 
those who do not work full time until retirement (Burkert and Hochfellner, 2013; Maestas, 
2010; Smeaton and McKay, 2003) – those who use the so-called continuous model of partial 
retirement are a case in point for part-time work before retirement.  
The argument that employees who select partial retirement have a higher value of leisure 
seems to be obvious because workers have to give their consent for trading earnings against 
an earlier employment exit (Wanger, 2009). Employers therefore are more successful in 
nudging employees with a lower labor market attachment at old age into partial retirement. 
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 Please note that the concept of bridge employment in Germany differs from that used in the US (Beehr and 
Bennett, 2015). In Germany, bridge employment means that employees exit employment earlier then retirement 
or reduce their working time in their career job or they exit into unemployment from their career job before they 
enter retirement. In the US, bridge employment usually means taking another job after their career job. 
4
 Almost all employees in bridge options in the cohorts we look at also are entitled to use other early retirement 
options such as the pension for women and the pension for the long-term insured. Indeed many employees in 
bridge options use these alternative early retirement options after their bridge option. 
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The group of employees who bridge the time between employment and retirement by 
unemployment may mainly consist of workers who have been dismissed against their wills 
and therefore their value of leisure is unclear. We however have to take into account that older 
employees in Germany are very well protected against dismissals (Schmähl, 2003). They 
usually obtain substantial severance payments (Grund, 2006). The severance payments 
however are subject to individual bargaining between employer and employee. Therefore 
employers may pick employees with a relatively strong preference for leisure at old age 
because dismissing them may be cheaper. The fifth hypothesis therefore is: 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals using bridge paths into retirement have lower earnings elasticities 
than individuals who are employed until retirement. 
Individuals with different places of work and residence before retirement have commuting 
costs. According to labor supply theory, at given earnings, commuting costs reduce the 
opportunity cost of leisure and may reduce labor supply (Cogan, 1977; 1981). We therefore 
assume that individuals whose place of work is not the place of residence before retirement 
are less attracted by financial incentives to work after retirement: 
Hypothesis 6: Individuals whose place of work and residence is in the same region before 
retirement have higher earnings elasticities than individuals who have to commute. 
Our last hypothesis concerns heterogeneity by income quartile before retirement. Bastani et 
al. (2020) show that earnings elasticity decreases with potential earnings. They argue that 
those with low potential earnings have a lower labor market attachment and therefore their 
potential for entry into the labor market is higher. For our group of old workers who have to 
decide whether to re-enter employment after labor market exit before retirement, this 
argument is not valid. We however argue that the risk of having pension entitlements below 
the target level of earnings after retirement (“old-age poverty”) is higher for those with low 
earnings before retirement (Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017) and the financial aspect of work 
after retirement may play a larger role for those who earned less before retirement (Fasbender 
et al., 2016):  
Hypothesis 7: Individuals with lower earnings before retirement have higher earnings 
elasticities. 
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3 Data 
Our analysis is based on a large, representative, and high-quality administrative dataset 
provided by the Federal Employment Agency in Germany (Bundesagentur für Arbeit). The 
data comprise a sample of 2% of employees from the Integrated Employment Biographies 
from 1975 to 2014 (SIAB, 1975–2014)
5
. The data provide daily information about earnings 
and employment as well as receipt of benefits according to German Social Books II and III. 
We also know whether an employee is marginally employed or not. Approximately 80% of all 
employees are in marginal employment6 after retirement. The share of women who work 
more than in marginal employment is with 18% somewhat smaller than the share of men 
(22%). Moreover, an extensive set of establishment information from the IAB Establishment 
History Panel is linked to the individual employment history.  
We know daily earnings of employees after retirement. Earnings from marginal employment 
and pension entitlements are income tax free and do not require social security contributions 
in contrast to labor earnings beyond marginal employment.7 We want to have comparable 
earnings indicators for employees in marginal employment and employees who work more 
than that. We argue that disposable income is more relevant for the decision whether to work 
or not than gross earnings. Therefore, we use net earnings without taxes and social 
contributions for labor earnings above the marginal employment threshold. More specifically, 
we deduct earnings taxes for earnings tax class 1, the solidarity surcharge, church tax and 
social security contributions to health and nursing care insurance. 
We know the day at which employees exit from the last employment subject to social 
insurance contributions before retirement.
8
 Individual and company-specific characteristics 
are measured at this point in time. 
We do not observe pension entrance directly and therefore define two groups with post-
retirement employment. First, individuals who have a labor market spell after their normal 
retirement age (NRA) of 65. Second, individuals who already started a marginal employment 
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 A detailed description of the SIAB can be found in Antoni et al. (2016). 
6
 Marginal employment is defined as dependent employment with a maximum monthly salary of 400 EUR 
(raised to 450 EUR in 2013). 
7
 Tax and deduction exemptions on marginal employment were abolished just in 2012. 
8
 In Germany, it is compulsory to report the end of employment to the social insurance system after the statutory 
retirement age. In the case of employment after retirement, the employer must provide a new contract and submit 
a new declaration to the social insurance, even if the employee was already employed by the company. Thus, 
employment is interrupted after pension entry by one day (Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017; Antoni et al., 2016). 
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before the age of 65 that extends beyond the age of 65 without interruption and who are 
eligible for early retirement9. We may incur three sources of measurement errors. First, there 
may be individuals who work longer than NRA without receiving a pension. People born after 
1940 who retire after the NRA receive a 6% increase in pension entitlements each year. This 
option was available from the year 2005 onwards but the share of employees who postponed 
their entry into retirement after NRA was negligible ever since.10 We include these individuals 
as employed after NRA but assume that they also draw pension benefits after 65. Second, 
there may be individuals who receive pensions besides working but stop to work before age 
65. We cannot observe this group of people and therefore our results only cover all 
individuals who work besides receiving retirement benefits after NRA. The third group works 
more than marginally before NRA in addition to receiving pensions. This group again is 
negligibly small because earnings beyond the threshold of marginal employment strongly 
reduce pension claims (Westermeier, 2019). Unfortunately, there are no statistics on the 
incidence of this group, however. 
3.1 Estimation sample 
Our estimation sample consists of women and men born between 1935 and 1947. For each 
birth cohort, post-retirement employment is observed for a maximum of two years after the 
NRA. As work incidence quickly declines with age after 65 in Germany (compare for 
example Pfarr and Maier, 2015), we are confident that we do not miss any retirees who start 
to work in retirement after their 67
th
 birth day. We restrict our sample to West-German
11
 men 
and women with a strong labor market attachment in old age. More specifically, all 
individuals in the sample must be employed subject to social security at least once after the 
age of 5512 and they must be active in the labor market (employed, in partial retirement, or 
unemployed) at age 59.13 The reason for these sample restrictions that reduce our sample by 
about 30% is to obtain a relatively homogeneous sample of employees who in principle all 
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 The SIAB data do not include relevant characteristics of the pension insurance, such as pension entitlements or 
eligibility. Therefore, individual pension entitlements are calculated and eligibility criteria for old age pensions 
and the corresponding statutory retirement dates NRA and ERA are identified according to Pfister et al. (2018) 
and Lorenz et al. (2018). We are grateful to Philip vom Berge and Dana Müller from the FDZ at the IAB for 
merging the day of birth as part of the Custom Shaped Administrative Data for the Analysis of Labor Market 
(CADAL) project because the calculation of pension entitlements requires the exact birth date. 
10
 Bäcker et al. (2017) for example report that in 2014, from about 825.000 retired individuals only about two 
percent or 22.000 individuals received a bonus. 
11
 Labor market careers are only available for East Germany after January 1, 1991 (Antoni et al., 2016). 
12
 This sample restriction was also made by Hanel (2010) and Geyer et al. (2019). 
13
 We also exclude seamen and miners (less than one percent of women and of men) because they have special 
protection of legitimate expectation rules for retirement that cannot be identified in the dataset. 
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have the option to work after retirement. It is relatively hard in Germany to return to the labor 
market after larger labor market gaps at higher age – in the group of employees excluded from 
our sample, the share or employees who work after retirement accordingly is less than one 
percent.  
After the sample restrictions we are left with 30,784 women and 44,887 men. In the sample, 
6,273 women and 9,549 men continue to work after retirement, corresponding to an average 
of 20% for women and 21% for men.
14
 Across cohorts, the share of individuals who work 
beyond retirement has risen slightly. The number of observations and the share of individuals 
who continue to work after retirement by birth cohort are shown in Appendix Table A.1. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
Our analysis focuses on financial incentives for employment beyond retirement. The 
following descriptive statistics accordingly show average daily earnings, average pension 
entitlements, and the average share of labor earnings in pension entitlements by gender and 
type of employment after retirement (Table 1). The average daily net earnings after retirement 
are 14 EUR for women and 20 EUR for men.
15 
For those who are marginally employed, daily 
earnings for both sexes are around 9 EUR. Pension entitlements of women who continue to 
work after retirement are on average 40% lower than those of men. Of particular interest is the 
share of labor earnings after retirement in total income. This share is with 66% for women and 
53% for men substantial in comparison to pension entitlements. For employees in marginal 
employment, the proportion of the post-retirement earnings in disposable income is 47% for 
women and 27% for men. We therefore conclude that earnings after retirement are an 
important additional source of income for securing the standard of living in old age.
16
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 The proportion of employees who continue to work after retirement is slightly lower than that calculated by 
Anger et al. (2018). In their study, however, employment after retirement is identified from survey answers. 
15
 Women have no earnings after retirement above the social contribution earnings threshold and for men the 
proportion with earnings above the earnings threshold is 0.3%. We therefore do not have to correct for censored 
earnings. 
16
 Please note that we cannot take into account other sources of income, such as private pensions, capital rents or 
savings. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics on work and non-work earnings. 
 
Women Men Women Men Women Men 
  
Daily net labor earnings 
(EUR) 
Daily pension entitlements 
(EUR) 
Share of net labor 
earnings in disposable 
income (%) 
  All employees who work after retirement 
Mean 14.013 19.770 23.016 39.122 65.94 52.97 
SD 14.037 24.660 9.210 11.737 60.68 65.59 
N 6,273 9,549 6,273 9,549 6,273 9,549 
  Employees with marginal employment after retirement 
Mean 9.406 9.514 22.637 38.510 46.93 27.06 
SD 3.416 3.453 8.643 10.584 24.70 15.28 
N 5,175 7,350 5,175 7,350 5,175 7,350 
Note: SD: standard deviation. Data: SIAB 7514, own calculations. 
We also can show that those who continue to work after retirement on average have a 
significantly lower pension entitlement than individuals who do not work after retirement 
(Appendix Table A.2). This finding corresponds with the negative correlation between non-
labor earnings and re-entry into employment after retirement found in most of the literature 
(Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017; Büsch et al., 2010; Dittrich et al., 2011; Hochfellner and 
Burkert, 2013; Kim and Feldmann, 2000; Micheel et al., 2010).17 Appendix Table A.2 also 
summarizes differences in individual and establishment characteristics prior to retirement 
between employees who continue to work after retirement and those who do not. It shows, for 
example, that there is a negative correlation between work after retirement and employer size 
as well as the share of highly skilled workers. 
4 Estimation strategy 
We propose an empirical choice model to examine the employment decision after retirement. 
The decision to participate in the labor market is estimated based on a linear probability 
model using the employment status after retirement as the outcome variable: 
LFP = β + X β + Z ( )β + γ𝑝𝑒 + δ𝑤𝑎𝑔?̂? + ε   LFP = 1 if LFP
  >0 
LFP = 0 if LFP  = 0  (1) 
The labor force participation variable (LFP) is a dichotomous variable with a value of zero for 
non-participation and a value of one for post-retirement employment. The latent variable LFP  
reflects the utility difference between non-participation and participation in the labor market 
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 Two studies however show that employees with higher financial means are more likely to work beyond 
retirement (Anger et al., 2018; Pfarr and Maier, 2015). 
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beyond retirement. Our main variables of interest are the log disposable pension entitlements 
pe (non-labor earnings) and the net (potential) labor earnings wage.
 18 
Labor earnings after retirement may be endogenous because they also reflect time allocation 
decisions, that is, they are only observed for those who work after retirement. In order to 
circumvent this endogeneity problem, predicted daily labor earnings after retirement 𝑤𝑎𝑔?̂? 
are estimated for all individuals in an auxiliary estimation. The standard Heckman sample 
selection approach (Heckman, 1976; 1979) is used to predict the earnings of post-retirement 
employment. More specifically, we first estimate a reduced-form employment participation 
Probit for all individuals in the sample. We use the Probit parameters from this participation 
equation to generate the inverse Mills ratio. Including this ratio controls for possible sample-
selection bias in the wage equation. We then take the results of the wage equation to generate 
values of the predicted wage for all individuals in the sample (Borra, 2010).  
Technically, this type of selectivity corrected model can achieve identification by functional 
form assumptions (Cameron and Trivedi, 2002). In practice, nonetheless, most researchers 
feel more comfortable if at least one regressor in the participation equation is excluded from 
the labor earnings equation (Connelly and Kimmel, 2003). We therefore include in the 
reduced form labor participation equation the accumulated pension entitlements. Pension 
entitlements indicate the negative income effect in the participation equation and therefore are 
strongly related with labor participation. Pension entitlements are an indicator of past labor 
market performance. Given that all employees obtain a new labor contract, usually entailing 
less labor hours and new tasks, previous labor market performance seems to be hardly related 
to (potential) earnings after retirement and it therefore can be excluded from the earnings 
equation.   
Besides the exclusion restriction in the participation equation and the Mills ratio in the 
earnings equation, we include core individual characteristics that have been used in the 
literature as determinants of work after retirement (Anger et al., 2018; Brenke, 2013; Brussig, 
2010; Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017; Engstler and Gordo, 2017; Fasbender et al., 2016; 
Micheel et al., 2017; Rhein, 2016; Westermeier, 2019). We keep the auxiliary regressions 
parsimonious in order to avoid multicollinearity problems in our main labor participation 
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 In a further estimation specification, instead of the expected earnings and the pension entitlements, the ratio of 
the (potential) earnings in pension entitlements is included in the equation.  
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regression (Borra, 2010). More specifically, we include education, occupation
19
, accumulated 
labor market gaps until age 65 in months
20
, and the year of labor market exit. 
In the main labor participation equation, we include all explanatory variables used in the 
auxiliary participation equations and potential labor earnings. In addition, we include 
dummies that equal one if an individual uses the bridge option partial retirement or 
unemployment because labor market gaps before retirement negatively affect the continuation 
of employment after retirement (Anger et al., 2018; Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017; 
Schellenberg et al., 2005; Smeaton and McKay, 2003; Westermeier, 2019). We also include 
several characteristics of the last employer before retirement. Previous studies have shown 
that employees in small establishments have a higher probability of working beyond 
retirement (Anger et al., 2018; Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017; Micheel et al., 2010). In 
addition, Brussig and Bellmann (2008) show that attitudes towards hiring older workers differ 
among companies. For example, employees in companies with a high proportion of older 
employees have a higher chance of being hired after their retirement than those in companies 
with a high proportion of employees in partial retirement and severance payments. Moreover, 
some studies also include the general economic environment as a determinant of employment 
after retirement. We therefore include the mean imputed earnings of all full-time employees, 
economic sector, establishment size, share of employees in partial retirement, share of highly 
qualified employees, share of employees aged 55–59, share of employees aged 60–64, and the 
share of employees aged 65 and older. 
We take into account that the decision to work after retirement is fundamentally different 
between men and women because the non-market production situation usually differs. We 
therefore estimate all earnings and participation equations separately by gender.  
                                                          
19
 The Blossfeld classification of occupations is intended to form occupational groups as homogeneously as 
possible with regard to average educational and vocational background and professional fields of activity 
(Blossfeld, 1985).  
20
 An alternative for the aggregated gaps in the labor market before the age of 65 is the exit age from 
employment before the statutory retirement age. The results are robust. It is not possible to include both variables 
in the estimations because they are strongly correlated. Early retirement is associated with more gaps in the labor 
market before the age of 65. 
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5 Estimation results 
5.1 Employment decision to work beyond retirement 
The first estimation step, the calculation of the Heckman selection earnings equation, is 
shown in Appendix Table A3. The Hausman specification test indicates that the pension 
entitlements variable is a valid instrument to control for endogeneity. We present our 
estimation results of the decision to work beyond retirement in Table 2, separately for women 
(column I) and men (column II). The OLS estimates suggest a substantial positive effect of 
the (potential) earnings on labor supply for women and men. According to hypothesis 1, an 
increase in (potential) labor earnings by one percent significantly increases the probability of 
being active in the labor force by 0.056 and 0.246 percentage points, respectively. According 
to hypothesis 4, labor earnings elasticity is much higher for men than for women. 21 Consistent 
with hypothesis 2, an increase in pension entitlements significantly reduces the employment 
probability by 0.055 percentage points for women and 0.165 percentage points for men. A 
higher pension entitlement leads to a stronger reduction in labor market participation for men 
than for women. 
Also the individual characteristics show the expected signs on employment after retirement. 
Employees who use bridge paths have a significantly lower probability to work and therefore 
labor market gaps before retirement have the expected negative correlation with labor market 
participation after retirement. Academics work less after retirement than skilled employees 
(also compare Burkert and Hochfellner, 2017). Prior occupations hardly have an influence on 
working after retirement, however.22  
  
                                                          
21
 We obtain larger coefficients for the estimated earnings variables in the labor participation equation if we drop 
the endogeneity correction (Mills ratio) in the earnings estimation step. (Potential) earnings however remain 
significant and larger for men than for women. 
22 
All results remain robust when only individual characteristics are included in the participation equation and 
employer characteristics are not controlled.  
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Table 2: Linear probability model of labor force participation. 
  Women Men 
 Dependent variable: labor force participation   
Individual characteristics 
 Estimated earnings (log) 0.056* 0.246** 
 
(0.019) (0.055) 
Pension entitlements (log) -0.055** -0.165** 
 
(0.006) (0.008) 
Bridge option: partial retirement -0.078** -0.060** 
 
(0.007) (0.005) 
Bridge option: unemployment -0.323** -0.266** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
No degree ref. ref. 
Vocational training 0.032** 0.025 
 (0.006) (0.013) 
University degree 0.005 -0.075* 
 (0.012) (0.031) 
Manufacturing occupations Ref. Ref. 
Service occupations 0.011 -0.021 
 
(0.008) (0.014) 
Administrative occupations -0.010 -0.042** 
 
(0.008) (0.012) 
Accumulated labor market gaps prior to age 65 in months -0.006** -0.001 
 (0.0007) (0.001) 
Employer characteristics 
 Firm size: <10 employees Ref. Ref.  
10 to 100 employees -0.027** -0.019** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
>100 employees -0.044** -0.059** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
Mean imputed earnings of all full-time employees -0.0004** -0.000006 
 
(0.00009) (0.00006) 
Share of highly qualified employees -0.027 -0.112** 
 
(0.016) (0.016) 
Share of employees in partial retirement -0.204** -0.128** 
 
(0.061) (0.049) 
Share of employees aged 55–59 -0.030 -0.013 
 
(0.017) (0.017) 
Share of employees aged 60–64 -0.033 -0.065** 
 
(0.023) (0.021) 
Share of employees aged 65 and older 0.514** 0.527** 
 
(0.048) (0.051) 
N 30,784 44,887 
R
2
 0.307 0.210 
Notes: Additional controls: year of employment exit, and economic sector of the employer. Standard errors in 
parentheses are computed by bootstrapping with 200 repetitions and are clustered on the individual level. * p < 
0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data: SIAB 7514. 
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The effects of the establishment characteristics of the last employer prior to retirement on the 
labor market decision of the retiree are also according to expectations. Workers who are 
employed in firms with more than ten employees prior to retirement show a lower labor force 
participation after retirement. Furthermore, there is a negative correlation between mean 
earnings of all full-time employees, the share of highly qualified employees, and the share of 
employees in partial retirement and work after retirement. The higher the share of employees 
who work after retirement at the last employer, the higher is the probability of being 
employed after retirement. 
Note that the (potential) labor earnings regressor is generated because it has been estimated in 
a separate step with uncertainty (Borra, 2010). Therefore, the standard errors of this variable 
are bootstrapped. A bivariate Probit model is used to verify the results of the linear probability 
model presented in Table 2. The results of both estimation models are consistent with each 
other. 
The estimation equation in Table 3 replaces the separate labor earnings and pension 
entitlement variables by the share of expected earnings in disposable income. This variable 
has a substantial positive impact on the extensive margin of labor supply. An increase in the 
share of (potential) labor earnings in disposable income after retirement by one percentage 
point increases the probability of working beyond retirement by 0.22 percentage points for 
women and 0.82 percentage points for men. This result supports hypothesis 3.  
Table 3: Linear probability model of labor force participation with the share of estimated 
earnings in disposable income. 
  Women Men 
  
 Share of estimated earnings in disposable income  0.222** 0.816** 
 
(0.054) (0.057) 
N 30.784 44.887 
R
2
 0,306 0,206 
Notes: Same list of covariates as in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses are computed by bootstrapping with 
200 repetitions and clustered on the individual level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data: SIAB 7514. 
5.2 Heterogeneity in earnings elasticities 
Table 4 shows differences in the estimated elasticity of labor force participation with respect 
to (potential) labor earnings between employees who use bridge paths versus those who do 
not use bridge paths prior to retirement. In line with hypothesis 5, the estimates suggest a 
higher positive earnings effect on labor supply for employees without bridge paths than for 
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employees with bridge paths. The earnings elasticities for employees without a bridge path 
are twice as large for women and 50% larger for men than those for employees with bridge 
paths. Employees without bridge paths therefore seem to derive lower utility from leisure and 
they are more responsive to financial incentives when deciding about employment after 
retirement. 
Table 4: Extensive margin of labor supply for employees with and without bridge paths. 
  Women Men 
  Bridge paths 
  No Yes No Yes 
Estimated earnings (log) 0.095** 0.057* 0.307** 0.244** 
 
(0.024) (0.029) (0.095) (0.064) 
N 19,887 10,897 19,223 25,664 
R
2
 0.407 0.067 0.287 0.071 
Notes: Same list of covariates as in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses are computed by bootstrapping with 
200 repetitions and clustered on the individual level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data: SIAB 7514. 
In a next step, we compare earnings elasticities between employees who have to commute to 
work to a different region in their last employment prior to retirement and those who live and 
work in the same region. We use the approach proposed by Kropp and Schwengler (2016) to 
delineate 50 functional West German labor market regions based on commuting flows.
23
 The 
dummy has value one if an employee commutes to a workplace outside the own labor market 
region. Our results do not support hypothesis 6: there are practically no differences between 
commuters and non-commuters for females and the differences between both employee 
groups are small for men.
24
  
Table 5: Extensive margin of labor supply for employees whose region of residence is the 
same as or different from the place of work. 
  Women Men 
  Region of residence is same as region of work  
  No Yes No Yes 
Estimated earnings (log) 0.062** 0.080 0.163** 0.234* 
 
(0.026) (0.083) (0.084) (0.146) 
N 19,080 2,289 25,799 6,769 
 0.313 0.315 0.239 0.233 
Notes: List of covariates is the same as in Table 2. Number of observations lower than in Table 2 because region 
of residence not reported for all employees. Standard errors in parentheses are computed by bootstrapping with 
200 repetitions and clustered on the individual level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data: SIAB 7514. 
                                                          
23
 The labor market regions are defined based on the place of work and the residential region is defined based on 
the place of residence at the last employment prior to retirement. 
24
 The results remain robust when the information about place of work and place of residence are directly used 
from the dataset instead of the approach proposed by Kropp and Schwengler (2016). 
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Our last sample split differentiates employees according to their earnings situation before 
exiting the labor market into retirement. According to hypothesis 7, we find a higher elasticity 
of men in the lowest earnings quartile in comparison to men in the highest earnings quartile. 
For women, the lowest and highest earnings quartiles both have lower elasticities than the 
second and third earnings quartiles and therefore hypothesis 7 is not supported for women.  
Table 6: Extensive margin of labor supply for employees with low and high earnings before 
retirement 
  Women Men 
 
Earnings before retirement 
  Low earnings High earnings Low earnings High earnings 
Estimated earnings (log) 0.084 0.063 0.384** 0.097 
 
(0.045) (0.039) (0.129) (0.110) 
N 7,441 7,441 10.706 10,706 
R2 0.365 0.273 0.283 0.171 
Notes: High earnings are defined as earnings from the last employment subject to social insurance contributions 
with earnings above the 75th percentile of all last earnings of employment subject to social insurance 
contributions. Low earnings are defined as earnings from the last employment subject to social insurance 
contributions with earnings less than 25
th
 percentile of all last earnings of employment subject to social insurance 
contributions. List of covariates is the same as in Table 2. Standard errors in parentheses are computed by 
bootstrapping with 200 repetitions and clustered on the individual level. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data: SIAB 
7514. 
7 Conclusions 
This paper provides a labor supply model for retirees and according empirical assessments 
based on a large administrative labor market history data set. We hereby for the first time use 
detailed information about labor earnings and non-labor income of a representative sample of 
all employees in Germany. We concentrate on the effect of labor earnings on the labor force 
participation beyond retirement and take endogeneity of the labor decision and heterogeneities 
between different employee groups into account. We first establish that labor earnings 
achieved by pensioners after retirement constitute a substantial part of disposable income. The 
share of post-retirement earnings in disposable income is more than 60% for women and 50% 
for men.  
Based on labor supply theory and existing empirical results for post-retirement employment, 
we show that men are more responsive to financial incentives after retirement than women. A 
one percent increase in post-retirement labor earnings increases the employment probability 
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of pensioners by 0.246 percentage points for males and by 0.056 percentage points for 
females. Earnings options therefore have a strong incentive effect for work after retirement. 
Higher pension entitlements however lead to a comparable negative labor participation effect. 
We analogously find that the higher the share of labor earnings in disposable income of the 
retiree, the higher is the labor force participation of the individual. We also find that 
individuals who work until retirement instead of using the bridge options unemployment or 
partial retirement and men with low earnings prior to retirement are stronger attracted by 
financial earnings incentives to work after retirement. Having to commute before retirement 
in contrast to residing in the same region as the place of work does not influence work 
participation after retirement, however. Our analysis therefore shows that tax incentives or 
higher earnings offers by employers are most effective to stimulate labor market participation 
after retirement for males who earned not much before retirement and did not use bridge 
options. However also female retirees can be attracted to work again after retirement if they 
obtain better earnings offers. 
Our paper uses the empirical identification approach developed for the employment decision 
of women with small children (Allègre et al., 2015; Borra, 2010; Ribar, 1992; Rammohan and 
Whelan, 2007; Viitanen, 2005). This literature mainly uses structural estimation models in the 
absence of quasi-natural experiments.25 Also for the literature on determinants for working 
after retirement, there are hardly any quasi-natural experiments that can be exploited to obtain 
causal relationships between financial incentives and the employment decision (Chetty et al. 
2011). The main reason for the dearth of quasi-experimental evidence is that there were 
hardly any changes in the rules for labor earnings after retirement. In Germany, earnings 
beyond marginal employment have to be taxed at the common rates, marginal employment is 
tax free and the maximum earnings level for marginal employment hardly changed.26 In 2005, 
a pension supplement of 6% per year of retirement after NRA was introduced for all pension 
entitlements. This option was used by a negligible share of retirees, however. 
In future work, retiree´s labor supply should be analyzed with respect to the number of hours 
worked conditional on employment (intensive margin). Our data set does not report hours 
worked and we therefore only could analyze the extensive margin. In addition, besides the 
pension entitlements, additional non-labor earnings during retirement such as rent from 
                                                          
25
 A notable exception is Bastani et al. (2020) who analyze the impact of a change in labor market participation 
tax rates on labor supply of secondary earners. 
26
 The maximum earnings level for minimum employment was increased on 1 January 2013 from 400€ to 450€, 
but further unchanged during our observation period. 
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wealth or real estate should be included. Moreover, decisions about labor supply after 
retirement may result from bargaining involving additional members of the household. 
Therefore, it is likely that earnings elasticities of retirees are also influenced by the financial 
situation of the partner or the household. 
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Appendix  
Table A.1: Number of individuals and share of individuals who work beyond retirement by 
birth cohort. 
  Women Men 
Birth  N Share  N Share  
cohort 2,056 0.193 3,180 0.205 
1935 1,934 0.192 3,075 0.204 
1936 1,992 0.202 3,142 0.215 
1937 2,384 0.206 3,586 0.178 
1938 2,675 0.197 3,933 0.207 
1939 2,582 0.206 4,091 0.193 
1940 2,807 0.174 4,306 0.200 
1941 2,783 0.192 4,052 0.196 
1942 2,336 0.194 3,292 0.201 
1943 2,330 0.204 3,334 0.215 
1944 2,418 0.208 3,201 0.206 
1945 1,775 0.235 2,551 0.254 
1946 2,264 0.223 2,934 0.261 
1947 2,504 0.229 3,390 0.265 
Data: SIAB 7514.  
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Table A.2: Sample characteristics. 
  Women Men 
  Work beyond retirement 
  No Yes Diff. No Yes Diff.   
Employee characteristics prior to retirement  
Pension entitlements 790.119 696.246 93.872** 1283.311 1183.442 99.869** 
 
(314.7) (278.6) (4.354) (414.2) (355.01) (4.641) 
Share of unemployment bridge path 0.258 0.159 0.099** 0.409 0.250 0.160** 
 
(0.438) (0.365) (0.006) (0.492) (0.433) (0.006) 
Share of partial retirement bridge path  0.136 0.045 0.091** 0.223 0.109 0.114** 
 
(0.342) (0.207) (0.005) (0.416) (0.312) (0.005) 
Manufacturing occupations 0.175 0.143 0.033** 0.550 0.468 0.082** 
 
(0.380) (0.350) (0.006) (0.498) (0.499) (0.006) 
Service occupations 0.308 0.356 0.048** 0.188 0.289 0.101** 
 
(0.462) (0.479) (0.007) (0.390) (0.453) (0.005) 
Administrative occupations 0.517 0.502 0.015* 0.262 0.244 0.019** 
 
(0.500) (0.500) (0.007) (0.440) (0.429) (0.005) 
Accumulated labor market gaps prior  
to age 65 in months 
32.777 4.309 28.468** 19.575 3.438 16.137** 
 (25.380) (13.736) (0.332) (22.322) (11.382) (0.236) 
Characteristics of last employer prior to retirement  
Firm size 
681.909 366.367 315.5* 1788.5 952.760 835.7** 
(2400.6) (1549.8) (31.885) (5732.3) (4163.6) (62.703) 
Mean imputed earnings of  89.652 80.465 9.188** 108.250 96.706 12.54** 
all full-time employees (33.863) (32.472) (0.475) (44.180) (38.056) (0.495) 
Share of highly  0.116 0.088 0.029** 0.131 0.098 0.033** 
qualified employees (0.162) (0.145) (0.002) (0.161) (0.144) (0.002) 
Share of employees  0.015 0.008 0.007** 0.022 0.015 0.007** 
in partial retirement (0.038) (0.028) (0.0005) (0.045) (0.043) (0.0005) 
Share of employees  0.133 0.120 0.012** 0.121 0.113 0.008** 
aged of 55 to 59 (0.135) (0.134) (0.002) (0.110) (0.110) (0.001) 
Share of employees  0.059 0.083 0.024** 0.057 0.077 0.020** 
aged of 60 to 64 (0.105) (0.137) (0.002) (0.098) (0.123) (0.001) 
Share of employees  0.012 0.032 0.020 0.009 0.028 0.020** 
aged 65 and older (0.039) (0.081) (0.0007) (0.036) (0.078) (0.0005) 
N 25,511 6,273 30,784 35,338 9,549 44,887 
Notes: Mean is given for continuous variables. Standard deviations of the continuous variables and standard 
errors for the mean value differences are given in parentheses. Data: SIAB 7514
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Table A3: Auxiliary estimations 
  Women Men 
Observations 30,784 
 
44,887 
  Censored observations 24,511 
 
35,338 
  Uncensored observations 6,273 
 
9,549 
  Log likelihood -11,791.378 
 
-19,581.156 
  Chi2(9) 7,545.47 
 
7,300.83 
  Prob > chi2: 0.2424 
 
0.000 
    Labour force participation Log Wage Labour force participation Log Wage 
  Coef. SE     Coef. SE     
Constant 1.292** 0.176 -0.637** 0.201 1.186** 0.0171 -1.320** 0.211 
No degree Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Vocational training 0.227** 0.027 0.231** 0.041 0.378** 0.028 0.231** 0.043 
University degree 0.043 0.049 0.351** 0.062 0.149** 0.034 0.566** 0.046 
Manufacturing occupations Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Service occupations 0.228** 0.029 0.261** 0.046 0.253** 0.018 0.223** 0.029 
Administrative occupations 0.096** 0.028 0.239** 0.037 0.073** 0.018 0.198** 0.023 
Acc. labor market gaps until 65 in months -0.033** 0.0006 -0.035** 0.004 -0.031** 0.0005 -0.022** 0.002 
Pension entitlements (log) -0.275** 0.025 
  
-0.494** 0.024 
  Lambda 
  
1.205** 0.157 
  
0.705** 0.084 
Hausman test               
Chi2(8) 57.73 69.00 
Prob > chi2: 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: In both equations, year of employment exit prior to the age of 65 is controlled for. SE: standard error. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Data: SIAB 7514. 
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